The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is estimated by integrated assessment models and is widely used by government agencies to value the climate impacts of rulemakings, however, the core discussion around SCC so far was focused on validity of obtained numerical estimates and related uncertainties while largely neglecting a deeper discussion of the SCC applicability limits stemming from the calculation method. This work provides a conceptual mathematical background and the economic interpretation that is behind the SCC calculation in the three widely used integrated assessment models. Policy makers need to be aware of a subtle, but decisive difference between the actual and the commonly implied meanings of SCC that substantially limits its applicability as compared to the current practice.
The concept of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) appeared in the early publications of Nordhaus (1) and dates back to the first works on the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model (2). SCC gained momentum for policy making in 2000's (3) and since then was widely used by a large number of organizations in policy making e.g. Worldbank (4) , US EPA (5) , UK (3) . While according to Nordhaus (1) the SCC did not play a decisive role in the evaluation of the US climate related policies, the SCC concept is well integrated in the current policy context and therefore plays an important role in assessments of climate related action. The United States Government's Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon is using the SCC according to respective regulation (5) relying for the purposes of the SCC estimation on the FUND 1 (6, 7) and PAGE 2 (8) (9) (10) (11) models along with the DICE model.
There are a few definitions of SCC e.g. "The social cost of carbon refers to the estimate of the monetary value of world-wide damage done by anthropogenic CO2 emissions" (3), "'social cost of carbon' is defined as the monetary value of the damage done by emitting one more tonne of carbon at some point of time" (3), "it is the change in the discounted value of economic welfare from an additional unit of CO2-equivalent emissions" (1), or "it is the change in the discounted value of the utility of consumption per unit of additional emissions, denominated in terms of current consumption" (12) , or "SCC estimates the dollar value of reduced climate change damages associated with a one-metric-ton reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions" (13) to name a few. In DICE, SCC is calculated as a ratio of the marginal value for the emissions equation to the marginal value for the consumption equation on optimal trajectories -those that deliver the maximum to the objective function, which represents societal utility. "The ratio calculates the economic impact of a unit of emissions in terms of t-period consumption as a numéraire" (12) . The DICE model (1) estimates the optimal Carbon Price (CP) that is a marginal abatement cost -a known function depending on time and the amount of abated carbon, which is a decision variable. A standard DICE 2016 model 3 run produces vividly different SCC and CP for the tail of the trajectory, see Fig. 1 . The difference between SCC and CP, generally speaking, is not confined to the tail of the optimal trajectory, so the same model, with the exception that the utility function is replaced with the one that is not weighted by population (14) , produces visibly different SCC and CP also at the head of the optimal trajectory, see Fig. 2 . The CP is a direct result of the optimization, and SCC is a co-product obtained via marginals on that same optimal trajectories of the model. As both represent the price/cost of the carbon by their names and are expressed in the same units, the puzzle is why there is a difference between the two and what implications does it have for applications. Unfortunately, the literature does not say anything clear on that and therefore cannot help, e.g.: "With an optimized climate policy (abstracting away from complications due to tax or regulatory distortions or inconsistent treatment in different sectors), the SCC will equal the carbon price; this in turn is equal to the marginal cost of emissions reduction" (12), or, (in a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) model) "the marginal social cost of carbon is the marginal damage done at the optimal level of abatement" (3), etc. Despite the lack of clarity, policy makers are keen on employing SCC for various reasons.
Definition and Calculation
To some degree the optimal carbon price is shadowed by the SCC -a combination of the two indirect products of the modelthe marginal of the emissions equation and the marginal consumption. As these two are just the Lagrangian multipliers (15) This allows one to call x and "exchange rate" from one ton of CO2 of emissions added to the equation and dollars that have to be added to the consumption to keep the "status quo" in terms of utility assuming the optimal solution in a new problem. This new problem is obtained from the original problem by perturbing its emissions and consumption equations and is further referred to as "perturbed problem". The "exchange rate" can be seen as a price compensating extra one ton of emissions to keep the societal "status quo", which justifies the name SCC.
A fully compatible alternative way of looking at SCC should be noted for further explanation. If x dollars are not added while one ton of CO2 is added to the emissions equation, the situation (in the sense of the optimal value of the utility function) is equal to the case when the emission equation is kept untouched, but x dollars are subtracted from the consumption equation. Both these perturbed problems would have, generally speaking, different optimal trajectories, yet the same optimal value of the objective function.
Interpretation
Here we provide an interpretation of a perturbed problem -the one with a perturbed equation(s).
We start with a question what is the meaning of the correction of the emissions equation by that one tCO2 in a particular year? The industry may decide for whatever reason to emit just a bit more than planned (whether the plan is optimal or not), however, that would imply that the abated quantity 4 For the ease of storytelling, we will consider adding emissions and refer to the equivalent monetary damage (decreased consumption) that it creates. A similar consideration of reducing emissions and its equivalent in terms of increased consumption is also valid.
According to a note made earlier in the text, subtracting x dollars from the consumption equation (while keeping emission balance equation intact) would achieve exactly that same effect on the optimal value of utility as adding one ton to emission balance equation (while keeping the consumption intact). This newly subtracted consumption x has to have the same "external" nature i.e. being something that is not controlled by the model similar to the discussed case of the nature of the emissions perturbation. Such an external source for consumption decrease could be a disaster that is not taken into account in the damage function of the model 6 . However, that is a rather virtual disaster, as it implies a pulse that only affects consumption, but does not affect the capital.
As we have noted earlier, this interpretation of SCC is fully compatible with the interpretation comparing an unperturbed problem with a perturbed one where a perturbation in emissions (plus or minus one ton CO2) is compensated by the perturbation in consumption (minus or plus x dollars respectively), so that the optimal social utility remains the same.
Discussion and Implications for Policy Context
The SCC equates emissions' and consumption perturbations in a perturbed problem in such a way that the maximum societal utility on an optimal trajectory of the new perturbed problem remains the same as in the unperturbed problem. This, however, has nothing to do with any deviation of actual emissions under control from the estimated optimal plan. For example, both over-emitting and under-emitting as compared to the optimum would lead to losses in utility and by that create a social cost in a wider sense. From this perspective, the SCC as calculated in (Eq. 1), seems to be an irrelevant concept to justify or enforce keeping emissions on an optimal trajectory in whatever form including its application as a carbon tax.
SCC only comes handy in case if, because of the reasons beyond the controls embedded into the model i.e. unforeseen event, the emission equation gets disturbed. In this case it only can estimate the monetary damage of such an event in the sense that if there were an "external" source for increasing consumption by that amount, that event would not have had any impact on the utility. In no case SCC can provide a guidance on how to re-distribute consumption and investment after such event has been discovered -to answer these questions one has to carry out an optimization of the new (perturbed) problem.
It is needless to say that SCC and carbon price are not comparable despite they are expressed in the same units. As the DICE model is run and an optimal solution is found, the CP is the only optimal carbon price in the societal context as reflected by the models utility function. This social optimality is unconditional on the value of SCC.
The findings obtained from the analysis of the SCC calculation in the DICE model are relevant beyond the scope of DICE itself. The discovered semantic issue is in the attempt to apply the SCC value (obtained via perturbed problem employing non-human made emissions that are different from those in the original problem) to shape human-made emissions through policies like a carbon tax. The FUND (6,7) and PAGE (8) (9) (10) (11) models that also estimate SCC, while being structurally different from DICE (12) , both employ the same idea of an "emission pulse" that increases total emissions by a pre-defined amount over certain period of time to generate a new "marginal" model (that is otherwise equal to the original), which then provides a trajectory to derive the SCC value. This newly added emissions are not caused by any change in the abatement and are the basis for the SCC estimation. The DICE model vividly demonstrates inconsistencies resulting from the application of such constructed SCC to enforce desired abatement.
